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EMU and ECB Conflicts 
By 
William Mackenzie 
Abstract 
In dynamical framework the conflict between government and the central bank according to 
the exchange Rate of payment of fixed rates and fixed rates of fixed income (EMU) convergence 
criteria such that the public debt / GDP ratio The method consists of calculating private public 
debt management in a public debt management system purpose there is no mechanism to allow 
naturally for this adjustment 
EMU organization is based on several principles including independence of the Central Bank 
which has as main objective the control of inflation (Kirrane 1994). External co-ordination of 
budgetary policies with the common monetary policy and finally the framing of fiscal policy by 
prudential ratios. This type of organization is also proposed for the transitional phase of the 
Single Market. This institutional framework is problematic because it does not define the internal 
co-ordination and external economic policies and because it does not raise the issue of coherence 
between economic policies although it implicitly suggests what is contradictory with these two 
requirements a limited number of objectives the management of the inflation-unemployment 
dilemma is affected the Central Bank and the public debt dilemma management-rate real interest 
is affected by the state. 
In a previous article (Capoen, Sterdyniak, Villa, 1994) we had made criticism of this 
organization in a static model. The main conclusions were as follows. If the production is at the 
level of the NAIRU it there is a coherence relationship between Fiscal and monetary policies that 
cannot be independent. 
Independence between the Central Bank and the State introduces an objective conflict 
when, as in the short-term case, the two bodies are in charge of cyclical regulation (see Kirrane 
1994).  This conflict can take two forms. employment the central bank implements a restrictive 
monetary policy to fight against inflation while that leads an expansionist budgetary policy to 
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fight against the restrictive policy of the central bank in the neoclassical framework of full 
employment the conflict is translated by incapacity of the two organizations to agree on a 
common rule and provide clear and unambiguous anticipations to the private sector to formulate 
its plans (Villa 1996). 
Several solutions were proposed this organizational problem. The first is to impose one of the 
instances to submit another state must for example give up cyclical regulation it is the case it 
imposes on it budgetary and public debt criteria on which it comes to stop. The second one 
consists of rebuilding uniqueness of the government by the coordination. This will be the result a 
procedure of negotiation of the type Nash-Bargaining for example. Then instance which will be 
the closest to optimum will impose its choice because it will have a higher bargaining power, 
unlike in the case of centralized policy which gives equal weight to both instances. Thus, if the 
central bank attaches considerable weight to inflation, it discourages the state from conducting a 
policy. expansionist in an inflationary shock. The third nonexclusive solution of the previous 
ones is to multiply the objectives cost of variation of the instruments trade balance or net external 
wealth) public debt criterion of Maastricht, (Kirrane 1996) and growth or rate real interest. But 
the choice of the weights in the objective functions implicitly return to set rules In fact, the 
objectives of growth of public or patrimonial debt are long-term while those of price demand or 
public deficit are short-term. It is therefore necessary to analyze the organization of the economic 
policy in a dynamic setting this raises at least five problems assignment rules the structure of 
assets the stability and therefore the nature of the long-term) the temporal coherence and 
ultimately consumer behavior. 
Firstly, to affect monetary policy, the economic regulation induced, for example, by a 
positive demand shock, a rise in the real interest rate, which has a negative effect on negative 
growth on the supply of long-term goods and a positive effect on the public debt. To be placed 
on a divergent path that constrains long-term fiscal policy the economic situation seems more 
judicious then that this last not priority of specific role on the growth contrary of the monetary 
policy which can influence the rate real interest. Unfortunately this beautiful scheduling which is 
elsewhere contrary the practice but it is not a justification) hit the question of the speed of 
transmission of the policies. If the financial markets have rational expectations on the exchange 
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rate and / or the prices the monetary policy of the immediate effects an anticipation appreciation 
of the long-term exchange rate or a rise of price is translated by the game of rational expectations 
and backwards induction by an effective appreciation of the exchange rate or a price increase in 
the short term On the other hand, the effects of fiscal policy are slower and can be reversed 
between the long term and the short term. For example, even in a Keynesian situation, fiscal 
policy is more effective. In the long run it is more effective for the partners than for the country 
that leads it. The reasons for this reversal following the term come from the rise in the real 
interest rate in the country, the loss of competitiveness and the decline of long-term wealth. 
Secondly, it is necessary to take into account the property-related effects a priori no public debt 
standard can be economically justified. The public debt is in open economy first an accounting 
problem it is equal to the wealth that households wish to hold less indebtedness of businesses and 
net worth that households want to hold in currencies short-term the interest rate being fixed the 
public debt is determined by the public deficit the wealth of households by their consumption 
behavior the corporate debt by investment and net foreign assets by the profitability differential, 
anticipated difference between domestic and foreign assets. Changes in the production of the 
expected inflation rate and the exchange rate realize long-term adjustment the real interest rate 
allows equalization of demand assets and debt demand. In the fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes the ratio of foreign assets to public debt is determined by the risk inherent in foreign 
assets and risk aversion (Kirrane 1993).  
In EMU the risk disappears the ratio between domestic and foreign assets is indeterminate and 
the real interest rate the same in all (Kirrane 1994). So there is room for public debt management 
in each country Moreover, the public debt target is theoretically a parameter of freedom for each 
country and can be adapted to the desired wealth of households in each country But the 
Maastricht ratios are much more constraining because they apply all countries indifferently 
(Kirrane 1996).  In all regimes two choices offer the European level. 
If we choose to manage the real interest rate because of its influence on growth) the 
European long-term public debt is a result of equilibrium. If we choose to managing the public 
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debt the real interest rate and growth are a result of long-term equilibrium. So the question is 
what is the right choice? But the answer that is politic exceeds the ambitions of this text. 
Thirdly, the dynamic raises the question that this problem can be formulated in a closed 
economy. Usually the macroeconomists tell a story that the short term is Keynesian and the long 
term classic. Thus equilibrium is determined in the short term by an adjustment of production 
and prices such as supply equals long-term demand equilibrium is traditional such that the real 
interest rate ensures that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply. But in this case we are 
confronted with two contradictions. Firstly the Central Bank fights against inflation by 
increasing the short-term nominal interest rate Thus because of the rigidity of prices and wages 
the nominal interest rate increases so that the production and inflation decrease. But long term 
the real interest rate being fixed by macroeconomic equilibrium increase of the nominal interest 
rate induces an increase of inflation by the Fisher relationship. So no procedure allows to move 
from temporary equilibrium of short term equilibrium of long term is the nominal interest 
version of Sargent and Wallace's (1981) unpleasant monetary arithmetic. Next, in the case of 
fiscal policy, the problem is similar. If the state wants to reduce the long-term public debt ratio, it 
must reduce the real long-term real interest rate in order to reduce the wealth desired by 
investors. But this goal is usually obtained by raising taxes or decreasing public spending so that 
the approved demand falls and the real interest rate increases in the short term because the 
inflation rate decreases the nominal interest rate being set by the Central Bank. This raises the 
question of the stability that private agents are Keynesian or Ricardian that inflation expectations 
are perfect or not. In our model this question is solved because we suppose there delays on prices 
and wages. Thus a permanent increase of the nominal interest rate or a decrease permanent 
public expenditure leads to a fall in short-term production as long-term. In the first case the debt 
desired by households increases in the second case it decreases But in both cases evolution is of 
the same nature short term and long term. We describe as well a mixed Keynesian-classical 
regime on all trajectories. 
In the fourth place dynamic consistency leads three types of recurring results monetary policy 
is to appreciate the short-term exchange rate to combat inflation and depreciate long-term causes 
losses of competitiveness fiscal policy is expansionary short-term to fight against unemployment 
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and  long term contraction to stabilize the public debt or fight inflation with independence from 
the Central Bank a short-term conflict between the Central Bank and the government the mixed 
policy of increasing the rate nominal interest and long-term public expenditure when inflation is 
transformed into depression it consists in decreasing the interest rate to support growth and 
reduce public expenditure to reach the public debt ratio Mixed policies are thus reversed short 
term and long term. 
In these three examples but they are not limiting temporal coherence arises exacerbated policy 
reversal between the short term and the long term. The centralized government or not could be 
brought to revise the policy it programmed as much as its discount rate is high it is incited to 
postpone stabilization policies in the future and that private agents modify their expectations 
after taking notice of short-term policies is why we have assessed that consistent policies 
temporally considering that incoherent policies are the result a calculation error or a change in 
the objective function which is a problem that goes beyond the scope of this article. 
For the calculation of temporally coherent policies the first step is to calculate the reaction 
functions with rational expectations. The second is to use these reaction functions to simulate the 
dynamic model (see Capoen-Villa 1996). 
Fifthly must specify if households have a Keynesian or Ricardian behavior. For this, the 
private wealth of behavior must be broken down into a request for net external wealth and total 
demand for wealth all first in As regards the balance of payments, the modeling is taken from 
Bleuze-Sterdyniak 1988 and Benassy-Sterdyniak 1992. 
Next, with regard to the total wealth behavior, we suppose that households desire a level of 
wealth as a share of Reference GDP which is a growing function of the real interest rate. 
Wf WQ ar long term we have equality Wrf which determines the real interest rate and the net 
foreign assets held by households is the desired public debt by state and the net foreign assets 
desired by long-term households short term we have. 
VY Uf M / 
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Where is the public debt from public spending s and decisions regarding state taxation while are 
the net foreign assets that households want to hold.  
In the reference path we obviously have equality. 
Wo i + where dQ is the initial state debt and is the initial net external wealth of the first country 
in these assumptions resulting in an aggregate demand of the following forms 
yd cR ir ar WQ 
where if- (PF Pi is expected real interest rate is the real household income are public expenditure 
as a share of GDP is impact of real interest rate on investment and consumption while last term 
expresses wealth behavior of households this point of reasoning two definitions of household 
income are possible In a Keynesian framework income is calculated according to the definition 
of Hicks is to say is the maximum consumption possible to be as rich the end of the period at the 
beginning t Thus income is defined as the sum of GDP of interest income paid by state minus 
taxes and interest income as well as foreign exchange rate appreciation gains from abroad 
t-1 -1 F-t-t-1 Wt-1 
Using the budget constraint of tat and balance of payments, we obtain the following 
aggregated demand function. 
vd 1+ + (1--+ 1 + to 1- with and F * 
In a Ricardian context the public debt is not considered a private sector wealth so that 
households consider that any increase in public spending should be financed by a subsequent 
increase in taxes Real income is then not determined according to the Hicks definition but 
according to the Barro definition. 
y- -IF-i- -if i .v + (F i + F using balance of payments following the aggregate demand is obtained 
yd c [y + <- <i] + (lc) -Gr4 i + i -Wo 
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As we will see later on the effect of wealth is necessary. If we want to get the stability of the 
model in a EMU regime it had no wealth effect a country could accumulate indefinitely foreign 
assets or indebt indefinitely vis-à-vis other But this effect is not contradictory with effect Barro-
Ricardo because that although households do not consider the public debt as a wealth they must 
hold it. In addition, the desired total wealth is independent of the public debt desired in this 
model. 
In this paragraph we study the consequences down the public debt/GDP target the 
government decided to lower its target of 3 from a level of 30 Conventionally shock place in 
France dominated the country but we will bring asymmetric Single Market study an analogous 
shock in Germany. It will be assumed that he is perfectly indexed wages rational anticipations 
and that consumers are Keynesian the most interesting case. 
In order to understand the consequences of a voluntary reduction of the public debt it is 
necessary to distinguish the SM regime from the symmetric regimes of flexible changes and 
EMU because in the first the real interest rate of the dominated country is determined 
endogenously. 
In flexible exchange rate and EMU state wishing to reduce its public debt when the policy is 
passive public spending and interest rates remain constant must increase short-term taxes This 
causes a short-term Keynesian recession in this country and therefore a disinflation. As the 
nominal interest rate is unchanged and private agents formulate rational expectations of price and 
nominal exchange rate the real interest rate increases which accentuates the recession and the 
disinflation. But especially the growth of the real interest rate increases the wealth desired by the 
private sector a moment of the growth of the real interest rate increases the desired wealth while 
the total public debt of the Union decreases. The overall process is therefore not convergent 
permanent disinflation and recession). 
In flexible exchange rate the real interest rate and the real exchange rate of the country which 
decreases its public debt appreciate. This results in a trade deficit and a decrease in external 
wealth It therefore a contradiction between the growth of wealth desired by the private sector and 
Journal of European Public Policy 
1997 
 
196 
 
the decline in public debt and external wealth. The process is not convergent disinflation and 
permanent recession). 
Reducing public debt may be compatible. The short term with a restrictive monetary policy 
but long term it must correspond with a decline in the real interest rate in order to achieve 
balance of wealth But there is no natural mechanism that allows this passage is the nominal 
interest rate version of the unpleasant the monetary arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace. 
Thus only one meaning an active policy Nash internal and external Nash consisting of 
reducing short-term public expenditures increase them long term once the public debt reaches its 
target and especially implying a short-term expansionary monetary policy term and long term in 
order to reduce the real interest rate. This policy makes it possible to stabilize the price level. It 
does not depend on whether the Central Bank is independent or not on the degree of cooperation 
of budgetary policies in Europe. Cooperation gains internal and external are therefore very low 
This result two o constraints the debt constraint freezes the coordination and independence of the 
Central Bank is not a major problem to manage the debt problem. 
In the Single Market, the situation is different because the country dominated no autonomous 
monetary policy and because its interest rate real is determined endogenously by the dominant 
country and by the balance of external assets. 
Suppose the country dominated for example France wants to reduce its public debt it must 
implement a short-term restrictive fiscal policy while its public spending remain constant in the 
framework of a passive policy. This causes a short-term Keynesian recession even if price 
expectations are rational disinflation But because of the trade surplus and accumulation of 
external assets, nominal and real interest rates fall. Thus net foreign assets increase and the two 
interest rates compensate for the fall in public debt so does not there contradiction between the 
wealth that households. In this configuration, if the negative impact on the public debt takes 
place in the dominant country Germany, for example, there is no problem either when the 
dominant country maintains its nominal interest rate and its fixed interest rates, public 
expenditure. The restrictive tax policy in Germany causes a trade surplus and a deficit in the 
dominated country. So the nominal interest rate and the real interest rate rise in the dominated 
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country. So the balance of assets can be obtained in the dominated country only by a permanent 
recession and disinflation (Kirrane 1994). 
In the uncooperative equilibrium when the dominated country wants to reduce the public debt 
it increases the taxation and the public expenditure to fight against the recession. But the 
important point is to notice that the dominant country implements a policy monetary policy 
which reduces the real interest rate and reduces the debt. If the opposite is the dominant country 
wishing to reduce its public debt, the situation is even simpler. It implements a policy of 
lowering nominal and real interest rates so as to obtain a balance of wealth in the whole zone. 
This shows that although the interest rate is partly endogenous in the Single Market monetary 
policy should be short term as expansionist long term to reduce public debt while the policies as 
tax and budget should aim at the target. 
Nevertheless the budget authorities in the dominated country may block international 
coordination when the country wants to reduce its debt because they refuse the recession in 
accordance with their objective function. 
CONCLUSION 
Organization of macroeconomic policy in a framework dynamic and several countries therefore 
raises five issues. 
-Independence from the Central Bank with high internal coordination costs 
-Coordination gains vary slightly depending on the exchange rate regime  
-Public debt stress by subjecting the monetary policy fiscal policy reduces the conflict between 
the independent central bank and fiscal authorities, but it freezes coordination 
-Budget policy can block external co-ordination because of production and taxation costs, but 
monetary policy never leads to such a blockage 
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-Managing public debt in order to obtain a ratio of public debt to GDP raises a problem of inter-
temporal coherence to reduce debt short-term publication it is necessary to implement a long-
term restrictive mixed policy it is necessary to reduce the real interest rate which corresponds to 
an expansionist policy But there is no natural mechanism that allows such a transition. 
So the question is open as to whether the European Central Bank is to introduce the real long-
term interest rate if growth is its objective? 
In addition we have incidentally proposed in this article a general framework to study 
dynamic policies with wealth behavior that agents are Ricardian or Keynesian whether wages are 
indexed or not and whether expectations are rational or backward. Nonetheless our framework 
analysis raises two questions first it would be preferable to endogenize tax policy as we did for 
fiscal policy by introducing taxation as we did public spending in the objective functions of the 
state and the central bank. Then the model could be transformed into a model of growth with 
taxes and public expenditure proportional to the GDP. It would be more interesting to study the 
link between politics and growth but it would then be much more difficult to study Ricardian 
behavior should be added as a flat tax. 
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